FINMA headquarters in Bern. Switzerland’s financial regulator, FINMA, is embarking on a major internal shake-up that promises to transform how it oversees banks, insurers, and markets. Announced in early April 2025, the restructuring is a direct response to recent crises and criticisms, aiming to modernize FINMA’s approach to supervision. This report will delve into the specifics of FINMA’s new organizational structure, the regulatory failures that prompted the overhaul, and how it stacks up against U.S. counterparts like the SEC and FINRA. We’ll also explore the global ripple effects – especially for fintech companies operating across borders – and include expert perspectives on broader regulatory shifts.
Inside FINMA’s New Structure: Mergers and a Chief Risk Officer
FINMA’s revamp represents one of its most significant structural changes since the authority was formed in 2009. The goal is to break down silos, concentrate expertise, and enhance direct oversight. Here are the key changes in FINMA’s organizational structure effective April 1, 2025:
- “Integrated Risk Expertise” Division: A new cross-divisional unit consolidates all of FINMA’s risk specialists and analytical tools. This division will centralize topics like liquidity and capital adequacy, stress testing, credit risk, anti-money-laundering (AML), and sustainable finance. By pooling these risk functions, FINMA intends to strengthen integrated supervision across the financial industry. Notably, this division will also oversee FINMA’s on-site supervisory reviews, meaning the regulator’s teams will conduct more inspections directly at banks and firms rather than relying on third parties. Marianne Bourgoz Gorgé, formerly Head of Asset Management at FINMA (and a seasoned risk manager in the banking sector), has been appointed to lead this new risk unit.
- Merger of Markets and Asset Management Divisions: FINMA is combining its separate Markets and Asset Management supervisory departments into a single division. By unifying these areas under one roof (headed by Léonard Bôle, a veteran in AML and asset management oversight), FINMA hopes to “make the most of existing synergies”. In practical terms, this merger should improve oversight of investment firms and financial market infrastructures by avoiding duplicated efforts and fostering a broader view of capital markets supervision. It’s a recognition that modern financial services – from stock exchanges to fund managers – are interconnected and should be watched in a holistic way.
- New Chief Risk Officer (CRO) Function: In a move uncommon for regulators, FINMA is creating a Chief Risk Officer role within the authority’s executive team. The FINMA CRO will coordinate and optimize risk management processes across all business divisions. In other words, while the new Integrated Risk division provides expert analysis, the CRO at the top will ensure that risk considerations permeate every supervisory decision. This mirrors how large banks themselves employ CROs to oversee enterprise-wide risk – except here it’s the regulator applying that model to its own organization. FINMA’s CRO will likely harmonize risk assessments coming from banking, insurance, and markets teams, acting as an internal safeguard that emerging threats don’t fall through bureaucratic cracks.
- Centralized Policy and Digitalization Teams: FINMA is also centralizing its policy and legal expertise into a single division, and consolidating all matters of digitalization in its Operations division. Previously, expertise on regulatory policy might have been scattered among departments; now it will sit in one hub to ensure consistent, unified policy stances and rule-making. Similarly, concentrating digital finance knowledge (think fintech innovations, SupTech/RegTech tools, cybersecurity, etc.) within Operations is meant to sharpen FINMA’s focus on technological change. In an age of rapid fintech innovation, having a dedicated digitalization nerve-center should help FINMA adapt its supervisory tech and understand novel business models more swiftly.
These structural changes came into effect immediately in April 2025, reflecting a sense of urgency. FINMA’s CEO, Stefan Walter, has championed the overhaul as a way to promote “preventive supervision” – getting ahead of problems before they blow up. The new integrated approach is intended to allow FINMA to “achieve maximum impact” on regulated institutions while still keeping oversight “risk-based and proportionate”, Walter said. In practice, that means FINMA wants to focus its energy on the biggest risks (rather than one-size-fits-all bureaucracy) and intervene early with firms when warning signs appear. The Chair of FINMA’s Board, Marlene Amstad, noted that the reorganization also targets “new realities in the banking sector” and challenges like non-financial risks, conduct issues, money laundering, and cybercrime. Clearly, FINMA is retooling itself to be a more agile and risk-attuned regulator for the 2020s.
Why Overhaul Now? Credit Suisse, Regulatory Failures, and Public Pressure
Such a sweeping reorganization did not come out of the blue. It was catalyzed by a series of high-profile crises and criticisms that exposed shortcomings in FINMA’s existing setup. To understand the urgency, we need to rewind to the Credit Suisse collapse of 2023 – an event that shook Switzerland’s financial system and tarnished its reputation for stability. When Credit Suisse teetered on the brink of failure in March 2023, FINMA was the watchdog on duty. Although the immediate catastrophe was averted by an emergency takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS (engineered over a frantic weekend), the episode raised a painful question: Could FINMA have done more to prevent one of its largest banks from imploding?
The aftermath suggests that many believe the answer is “yes.” Switzerland’s government and parliament launched investigations into what went wrong, and the findings were often pointed at FINMA. A Parliamentary Investigation Committee spent 18 months dissecting Credit Suisse’s downfall and, in a December 2024 report, delivered 30 recommendations for avoiding a repeat. While the report blamed Credit Suisse’s management first and foremost, it also delivered significant criticism of FINMA’s supervision. Notably, the committee accused FINMA of being “too soft” on Credit Suisse in the years leading up to the crisis. For example, back in 2017 FINMA allowed the bank to use a special accounting maneuver that effectively lowered its capital requirements, which in hindsight left Credit Suisse more vulnerable. This decision (and others like it) signaled an overly lenient approach to a bank that was accumulating risks. Swiss lawmakers took issue with such forbearance and questioned why FINMA hadn’t acted more forcefully as Credit Suisse racked up losses and scandals from 2019 through 2022.
As a result, the parliamentary committee didn’t just critique – it called for empowering the regulator. It urged the Swiss government to bolster FINMA’s authority, recommending new powers like the ability to “name and shame” misbehaving banks publicly, levy fines on bank managers, and even impose temporary bans on dividends and share buybacks at troubled institutions. Essentially, lawmakers concluded that FINMA lacked some of the basic tools that regulators in other countries take for granted. (In fact, under current Swiss law, FINMA cannot issue monetary fines to banks – a striking limitation compared to the U.S. SEC’s far-reaching enforcement powers.) FINMA’s leadership has openly agreed that its toolkit needs to be expanded. CEO Stefan Walter – who took the helm in 2024, in the wake of the Credit Suisse saga – has been candid about the need for “stronger powers” for his agency. He has advocated for changes in the law to give FINMA more bite, aligning with the parliamentary recommendations.
While the legal reforms will take time (and face political headwinds in Switzerland’s traditionally bank-friendly parliament), FINMA’s management clearly decided they couldn’t wait to address internal weaknesses. This is where the 2025 restructuring comes in. By creating the Integrated Risk division and a CRO role, FINMA is shoring up its ability to identify and act on risks early, even under its existing authority. One major criticism was that FINMA relied too heavily on third-party auditors to flag problems at banks, rather than doing its own shoe-leather supervision. Indeed, an international panel of regulators noted that FINMA “continues to rely considerably on external auditors when checking on banks”, cautioning that auditors paid by the banks might hesitate to report major issues. The new structure directly addresses this: FINMA will “carry out more of its own on-site supervisory reviews” going forward, reducing reliance on outside auditors. By deploying its own exam teams more frequently into banks and financial firms, FINMA can gather independent insights and react faster to red flags. This approach echoes the style of U.S. banking regulators, which embed examiners in large banks to continuously monitor conditions – something FINMA had done less of until now.
Another driver for the overhaul is the sheer size of UBS after the merger. When UBS swallowed Credit Suisse, it created a Swiss megabank with around $1.6 trillion in assets – by some measures the most dominant bank relative to its home economy anywhere in the world. Global watchdogs like the Financial Stability Board (FSB) sounded alarms in early 2024, warning that Switzerland now carries one massive point of systemic risk on its shoulders. The FSB’s review of the Credit Suisse episode recommended that Swiss authorities “strengthen controls on large banks” and “bolster [FINMA] by giving it more resources and powers to promptly intervene” if trouble arises. In polite bureaucratic terms, that’s a stern message: beef up your watchdog before the next crisis hits. The FSB also highlighted that FINMA should be able to hold bank executives personally accountable for mismanagement – again hinting at the need for greater enforcement authority. FINMA’s new risk-focused structure can be seen as a proactive answer to these critiques. If Parliament and law limits the agency’s punitive powers for now, FINMA can at least reorganize to maximize the impact of the powers it does have – namely, supervision and moral suasion. By concentrating risk expertise and doing more on-site work, FINMA is trying to ensure that a Credit Suisse-style problem would be spotted earlier and handled more assertively. As Chairman Marlene Amstad put it, the changes address “the challenges that we will face as an integrated supervisory authority in the future,” from new banking realities to issues like misconduct and cyber threats.
Importantly, FINMA insists that some changes are not a direct result of the Credit Suisse affair. For instance, the departure of Birgit Rutishauser, FINMA’s Deputy CEO and head of insurance supervision, was announced alongside the reorg – but FINMA stressed that her resignation by end of April 2025 was independent of the structural overhaul. Still, the timing is hard to ignore: a long-time executive leaving as the agency remakes itself symbolically marks the end of an era. FINMA is shedding not just an old org chart, but also perhaps the complacencies of the past. In Swiss media, there’s been talk of FINMA needing a “cultural” change – to become a tougher, more hands-on regulator. The new structure, coupled with fresh blood in leadership (Vera Carspecken stepping in as interim insurance division head), is meant to facilitate that cultural shift.
In short, FINMA’s overhaul was driven by a perfect storm of factors: a near-disaster with Credit Suisse that exposed supervisory lapses, intense political scrutiny and public pressure to reform, and looming challenges of overseeing a super-sized UBS and fast-evolving financial risks. The message was clear that things had to change. As Switzerland’s finance minister and others pledged in 2023, the country “has to step up regulation of the banking sector” after the Credit Suisse debacle. FINMA’s reorganization is one tangible step in that direction – an attempt to fix the roof while the sun is (ZAzshopefully) shining, rather than in the middle of the next storm.
FINMA vs U.S. Regulators: How Do the New Priorities Stack Up?
FINMA’s makeover begs an interesting question: How does this new Swiss model compare to the regulatory approach in the United States, especially for agencies like the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) and FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority)? U.S. readers in the fintech space are well-acquainted with the American regulatory alphabet soup. Unlike FINMA – which is a unified regulator overseeing banks, insurance companies, securities dealers, asset managers, and more – the U.S. uses a fragmented regulatory system. Oversight is divided among multiple bodies: the SEC polices securities markets and investment management, FINRA (a self-regulatory body under SEC oversight) examines broker-dealers, banking regulators like the Federal Reserve/OCC/FDIC supervise banks, and so on. This fragmentation means that the organizational structure and priorities of any single U.S. regulator will inherently be narrower than FINMA’s broad remit. That said, there are some notable parallels and contrasts in how FINMA’s new strategy lines up with recent U.S. regulatory trends.
Risk Focus and Integrated Oversight: One clear theme in FINMA’s reorg is the emphasis on risk-based supervision. By establishing an Integrated Risk Expertise division and a CRO, FINMA is embedding risk analysis at the heart of its operations. U.S. regulators also strive for risk-based oversight, but they implement it through different means. The SEC, for example, in recent years has beefed up its internal risk analytics – it created an Office of Risk and Strategy within its examinations division to centralize risk assessment and surveillance of firms. This office, led by a Chief Risk Officer for the SEC’s exam unit, helps the SEC decide which brokerage or advisory firms to inspect by analyzing data for red flags. That’s conceptually similar to FINMA concentrating risk know-how in one division, though the SEC’s approach remains within the silo of market regulation. FINRA, for its part, has long operated a risk monitoring program where each member brokerage firm is assigned a team of risk analysts and directors who continuously assess the firm’s financial and operational health. These teams in FINRA serve to maintain an ongoing understanding of risks at each broker-dealer, analogous in spirit to FINMA’s push for more continuous, on-site supervision of institutions. In fact, FINRA in 2018 reorganized its exam and surveillance programs to better integrate risk monitoring – merging what used to be separate examination teams into a unified program for consistency and deeper risk focus. The bottom line is that both FINMA and U.S. regulators are moving away from checklist compliance and toward forward-looking risk supervision. FINMA’s edge as a unified regulator is that it can aggregate risks across the entire financial sector (banking, securities, insurance) in one place. In the U.S., that integration has to happen more via inter-agency coordination (for instance, regulators share data through the Financial Stability Oversight Council for system-wide risks). It’s worth noting that FINMA’s new CRO role has no exact equivalent at the SEC’s top level – the SEC doesn’t have one chief risk officer overseeing all divisions – but agencies like the Federal Reserve do have vice chairs or committees focused on systemic risks. FINMA’s move might even prompt U.S. regulators to consider whether a formal CRO position could enhance their own oversight coherence.
Division Mergers vs. Specialized Departments: FINMA’s merger of its Markets and Asset Management divisions is a bid to reduce silos. In the U.S. context, this is quite interesting because the SEC has separate divisions for Trading & Markets and Investment Management (each with distinct mandates). The SEC’s structure, in a sense, mirrors FINMA’s old setup – where markets oversight was distinct from asset management oversight. FINMA decided that in today’s environment, those activities are intertwined enough to supervise together. By contrast, the SEC shows no signs of merging its divisions; instead it relies on cross-divisional task forces when an issue spans multiple domains. For example, in regulating cryptocurrency, the SEC’s Trading & Markets, Investment Management, and Enforcement divisions have had to collaborate since crypto assets don’t fit neatly in one bucket. FINMA’s integrated model might allow it to react faster to such cross-cutting issues (like a crypto trading platform that is also an asset manager) because one executive board member now oversees what two SEC divisions would handle. FINRA similarly maintains specialized departments (e.g., separate teams for market regulation versus member regulation), though it tries to coordinate them. The trade-off here is between specialization and holistic view: U.S. regulators value deep expertise in a particular area, whereas FINMA is opting for a broader oversight lens. Neither is inherently “better” – they are different philosophies shaped by history and mandate. However, FINMA’s reform could be seen as an experiment in whether combining areas yields a stronger grasp of systemic risk. U.S. agencies will surely observe the outcomes; if FINMA uncovers risk connections between, say, asset managers and trading venues that were previously missed, it could inform how the SEC coordinates its own divisions.
Enforcement and Powers: Another point of comparison is the balance between preventive supervision vs. enforcement after the fact. FINMA’s new mantra is preventive (proactive on-site checks, early intervention). In the U.S., regulators certainly engage in preventive measures (like examinations and guidance), but there’s a heavier reliance on enforcement actions to punish and deter misconduct. The SEC and FINRA frequently bring fines, sanctions, and public censure to firms that violate rules. As noted, FINMA historically lacks the power to fine or easily “name and shame”—it must refer serious breaches to prosecutors or impose measures like license restrictions. Thus, FINMA’s emphasis on direct supervision is partly born of necessity: it must lean on moral suasion and early corrective action since its punitive stick is smaller. In contrast, the SEC can afford a slightly more reactive posture because the fear of enforcement hangs in the background for U.S. firms. This difference in powers also shapes priorities: FINMA’s restructure explicitly focuses on improving internal risk detection (so it can catch problems without needing fines), whereas U.S. regulators might focus on crafting new rules or enforcement priorities to address emerging risks. For example, when faced with the rise of SPACs (special purpose acquisition companies) or crypto token sales, the SEC’s response was to issue warnings and bring targeted cases to set precedents. FINMA, overseeing a smaller market, might instead intensify supervision of any firms dabbling in those areas to prevent rule-breaking in the first place.
Despite these structural differences, the priorities that FINMA and U.S. regulators highlight are strikingly similar in many ways. FINMA’s chair cited non-financial risks, conduct issues, AML, and cybercrime as key challenges – and one would hear nearly the same list from SEC Chair Gary Gensler or FINRA’s CEO Robert Cook. U.S. regulators are very much concerned with cybersecurity in financial firms, especially after high-profile hacks, and they routinely examine how firms guard against money laundering and ensure good conduct (for instance, FINRA’s 2023 report flagged firms’ obligations to monitor for AML and fraud in crypto asset transactions). ESG and sustainable finance – which fall under FINMA’s risk umbrella now – have likewise been on the U.S. radar, albeit sometimes contentiously. (The SEC only recently proposed rules for climate risk disclosure and created an ESG task force in enforcement, reflecting how regulators everywhere are grappling with the intersection of finance and sustainability.) And capital and liquidity stress-testing, a core part of FINMA’s integrated risk unit, are certainly a focus for U.S. bank regulators and even the SEC for large clearinghouses and money market funds. In fact, one could argue FINMA is now structurally doing what the U.S. tries to do via interagency cooperation: blending prudential oversight (capital, liquidity risk – typically the realm of the Fed/OCC) with market oversight (trading, conduct – the realm of SEC/FINRA) and conduct regulation (which in the U.S. is partly the CFPB for consumer finance). This integrated approach might give FINMA a more comprehensive view of a firm – for example, a big Swiss bank that has brokerage, asset management, and insurance arms will be seen by one regulator in totality. In the U.S., that same financial conglomerate would be overseen by multiple agencies each examining one piece. For fintech companies that often straddle multiple business lines (like offering both lending and investment products), FINMA’s model could theoretically simplify interactions: one regulator looks at all aspects of the fintech’s operations. In the U.S., a similar fintech might have to deal with the SEC for one product, a state banking regulator or the CFPB for another, and FINRA if it has a broker-dealer entity. That fragmentation can lead to either gaps in oversight or overlapping demands – something the U.S. has struggled with for years (hence periodic calls for regulatory consolidation, though none have materialized since the 2010 Dodd-Frank reforms).
To sum up, FINMA’s new structure is an interesting contrast to U.S. regulatory structure. It underscores the benefits of an integrated supervisor model – a single authority aiming for a unified, risk-centric view – versus the U.S. model of specialized but separate agencies. However, FINMA’s changes also highlight how U.S. regulators, even within their narrower mandates, have been pursuing similar objectives: better risk detection, more cross-firm oversight, and attention to issues like cyber and conduct. The SEC and FINRA likely view FINMA’s overhaul with a bit of envy (imagine the SEC being able to merge with a banking regulator – not possible in the U.S. political system) but also with curiosity as a case study. If FINMA’s approach yields more effective supervision (i.e. Switzerland avoids major blow-ups and contains emerging threats like crypto risks better), it could add fuel to debates about whether the U.S. should streamline its own regulatory architecture. Conversely, if FINMA struggles under the weight of too many responsibilities, it might validate the U.S. choice to keep different domains separate and specialized. For now, though, on both sides of the Atlantic the trend is clear: regulators are trying to get ahead of risks rather than chase after failures, whether by reorganization or by sharpening their existing tools.
Global Implications: A Ripple Effect for International Fintech and Regulatory Trends
FINMA’s restructuring doesn’t only matter for Switzerland. In our interconnected financial world, major shifts in how one regulator operates can influence thinking and practices globally. Fintech companies, in particular, often operate across multiple jurisdictions (think of a payments app headquartered in San Francisco, serving customers in Europe, and maybe licensed in Switzerland for certain services). Such firms and their investors are keenly interested in any signs of regulatory tightening or reform that could signal future requirements in other markets. So, how might FINMA’s overhaul reverberate internationally, and what does it say about broader regulatory currents?
A Bellwether for Post-Crisis Regulatory Reforms: The changes at FINMA can be seen as part of a broader pattern of regulators responding to the lessons of 2023’s financial turmoil. Around the world, 2023 was a year of sobering wake-up calls – not only Credit Suisse in Switzerland, but also several U.S. regional bank failures (Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank) and the collapse of crypto exchange FTX in 2022 before that. By 2025, regulators globally have been in “lessons learned” mode, assessing what went wrong and how to prevent it in the future. According to one global outlook, supervisors in many countries have zeroed in on the alignment of risk management and governance in financial firms, prodding firms to strengthen their risk culture in light of the 2023 failures. FINMA’s emphasis on integrated risk oversight and on-site reviews aligns with this international emphasis on better risk controls and early intervention. In fact, FINMA’s own “lessons learned” report on Credit Suisse (published December 2024) acknowledged that there were warning signals – like persistent losses and poor risk management at the bank – that should have prompted earlier action. Regulators in other countries have made similar self-critiques. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve’s review of the SVB failure admitted supervisory lapses and has led to changes in how examiners flag rapid growth and interest-rate risks. The global watchdogs like the FSB and Basel Committee are encouraging all jurisdictions to empower supervisors and close gaps. FINMA’s move to do more on-site inspections internally may inspire others: for example, smaller regulators in other countries who currently outsource much of their inspection work to audit firms might reconsider that balance and opt to build more in-house risk teams. We may see a mini trend of regulators hiring more risk specialists and creating internal “swat teams” to conduct surprise exams – a practice FINMA’s new structure explicitly supports.
Influence on Fintech Regulation Approaches: For fintech companies, one intriguing aspect of FINMA’s reorganization is the integration of digitalization efforts. By grouping all digital finance issues in one division, FINMA is essentially saying: “We take fintech and innovation seriously, but we’re watching the risks closely too.” Swiss regulators have generally been seen as innovation-friendly (Switzerland introduced a special fintech license category a few years ago to allow fintech startups to accept a limited amount of public deposits with lighter rules). However, FINMA has also been very strict on matters like crypto AML compliance – famously, it was one of the first to enforce anti-money-laundering rules on crypto exchanges and blockchain platforms. With the new structure, any fintech operating under FINMA (be it a crypto broker, a digital wealth manager, or an insurtech firm) can expect even more coordinated scrutiny. If your business model touches on multiple risk areas – say, a fintech bank dealing with crypto assets and AI-driven lending – FINMA’s integrated risk division will be looking at all those facets together. This could actually be efficient from the firm’s perspective (one regulatory unit that understands the full picture, rather than separate departments each asking for different data), but it also means there’s no hiding one risky part of the business behind another. For global fintechs, Switzerland might become a test case: If FINMA can show that it’s possible to both encourage innovation and manage risks through an integrated approach, other regulators could adopt a similar stance. Already, we see global regulatory convergence on some fintech issues: nearly every major financial regulator has issued guidelines on crypto-assets, is exploring AI oversight, and is tightening operational resilience expectations for cloud-based fintech operations. FINMA’s highlighting of cybersecurity and operational risk echoes regulations like the EU’s Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) and the U.S. bank regulators’ guidance on third-party risk. It suggests that fintechs worldwide should invest in robust risk management frameworks – regulators are coordinating informally by all demanding the same from the industry.
Regulatory Spillover and “Benchmarks”: When a well-respected regulator like FINMA makes a move, peer agencies often take note, if only to benchmark themselves. The U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), for instance, is another integrated regulator (for conduct and markets, with prudential oversight of smaller firms) and may look at FINMA’s CRO role and risk division as a novel model. Don’t be surprised if in a year’s time, conference panels feature FINMA officials sharing insights on the new structure, and regulators from places like Singapore, Australia, or Canada asking how they might implement similar ideas. We’ve seen this pattern before – after the 2008 crisis, many countries debated the merits of the “twin peaks” model (splitting prudential and conduct regulation) vs. a unified model. Switzerland stuck with a unified model in FINMA, and now is refining it. Other countries that have unified regulators (like MAS in Singapore or FSRA in Abu Dhabi) may likewise tweak their internal structure to elevate risk oversight, perhaps establishing their own cross-sector risk units or chief risk officers if they haven’t already. Conversely, in the EU – where financial supervision is split among the ECB for big banks and ESMA/EIOPA for markets and insurance – officials could cite FINMA’s agility as an argument for closer coordination. While the EU is unlikely to merge agencies, we might see something like joint risk task forces across agencies to emulate the information-sharing FINMA gets internally. The global trend in 2025 is a bit of divergence in rules but convergence in goals: as an EY analysis noted, many jurisdictions are prioritizing their own approaches in absence of perfect global harmony, yet “more scrutiny of firms’ operational and financial resilience” is a common focus everywhere. Each regulator is upping the ante on scrutinizing how well firms can handle shocks – be it a run on a bank, a crypto market crash, or a tech outage. FINMA’s initiative to centralize risk expertise is one way to do it; others may choose different methods, but the underlying intent is shared.
Expert Views on Regulatory Shifts: Industry experts and academics see FINMA’s overhaul as part of a corrective cycle in financial regulation. After a period in the late 2010s when regulation was somewhat static, the pendulum is swinging back toward reform – driven by real-world events. “Regulators worldwide are in a phase of introspection and innovation,” says a fictitious expert Jane Doe, a fintech regulation professor – and FINMA’s example is likely to be studied closely in her classes. (We include this imaginary quote in the spirit of the requested commentary style; in reality, news outlets have quoted figures like Huw van Steenis or bank CEOs on how regulators must adapt post-Credit Suisse.) Data points also reinforce this narrative: One could look at the number of major regulatory changes or new risk committees formed globally since 2023 – there’s been a notable uptick. The FSB’s call in Feb 2024 for Switzerland to strengthen FINMA was part of a broader message to G20 regulators to learn from the Credit Suisse collapse and sharpen their tools. In the fintech realm, a 2025 industry survey (hypothetically by Deloitte) might show that an overwhelming majority of fintech firms expect more intrusive inspections and risk assessments from their regulators than in years past. This is the new normal: regulators want to see under the hood of innovative finance companies, not just trust that all is well. FINMA’s new on-site review capacity embodies that philosophy.
On the flip side, there’s a question of whether more intense supervision stifles innovation. Some fintech advocates might worry that FINMA’s heavy risk focus could make Swiss licensing less attractive – will startups face more audits and slower approvals? FINMA would likely answer that effective supervision builds trust, which in turn is good for fintechs in the long run because it creates a stable environment in which to grow. There is evidence that jurisdictions known for strong, clear regulation (like the U.K. or Singapore) often attract fintech business, as long as the rules of the road are predictable. In that sense, FINMA’s reforms, by clarifying how it operates and what it expects, could increase Switzerland’s appeal to serious fintech players (especially those dealing with sensitive areas like wealth management or crypto custody who value a robust regulatory framework to reassure clients). Additionally, FINMA’s integrated approach might make it easier for a multifaceted fintech to engage with the regulator. For example, a global crypto exchange that offers trading (a market activity) and also asset management services might find a one-stop regulator more straightforward than dealing with separate agencies in each country. If FINMA can manage the conflicts of interest internally (e.g. balancing prudential vs. market transparency objectives), it could present a compelling case study that smart regulation can coexist with financial innovation.
In summary, the global implications of FINMA’s restructuring are significant. It serves as both a symbol and a catalyst: a symbol that the era of post-2008 regulatory complacency (if there was one) is definitively over, and a catalyst that may nudge other regulators to fortify their own oversight regimes. For internationally active fintech firms, it’s a heads-up that regulatory expectations are rising – not just in Switzerland but across the board. The specifics may differ (one country might require a chief risk officer at the firm level, another might conduct random stress tests), but the direction is clear. A U.S.-based fintech publication like this one can glean a clear takeaway: regulatory agility and risk awareness are now paramount, whether you’re dealing with FINMA, the SEC, or any forward-thinking regulator. Firms that preemptively bolster their risk management and compliance processes will likely find these global shifts to be less an obstacle and more an opportunity – an opportunity to distinguish themselves in a market that increasingly values resilience and trustworthiness.
A New Chapter for FINMA – and a Sign of the Times
FINMA’s organizational overhaul is more than just a bureaucratic rejig; it’s the financial regulator’s equivalent of a tune-up after a hard race. Switzerland has learned painful lessons from the Credit Suisse crisis, and FINMA is adapting to ensure it’s better equipped for the future. In doing so, it provides a fascinating point of comparison to U.S. regulators – highlighting differences in structure yet converging on similar goals of safeguarding markets and consumers. Globally, FINMA’s moves resonate as part of a wider story: regulators rethinking and reinforcing their approaches in an era of rapid financial innovation and unpredictable risks.
For the U.S. fintech audience, this Swiss saga carries a gentle warning and a reassurance. The warning: regulators will not hesitate to evolve dramatically in response to failures, and when they do, regulated firms must be ready to meet new expectations. The reassurance: the focus of these reforms – better risk management, more transparency, stronger governance – ultimately creates a healthier financial system in which honest fintech players can thrive. As FINMA enters this new chapter, many will be watching to see if the integrated supervisory authority can indeed prevent the next crisis. If it succeeds, don’t be surprised if elements of its approach start cropping up from Washington to London to Singapore. After all, good ideas in regulation, like in tech, tend to spread. And at the very least, FINMA’s bold step has sparked a fresh global conversation about how to best keep the financial giants (and upstart fintechs) in check, for the benefit of everyone who relies on a stable financial system.
